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Preston: One Unity, One Law

SEVERAL STATES, ONE UNITY, ONE LAW?
by
NICOLA PRESTON*

INTRODUCTION

The European Economic Community (EEC) was created by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957. Since then many more states have joined the EEC, including the
United Kingdom. One of the objectives of the EEC was to create a new legal order
to which all member states would be subject. This article discusses the nature and
operation of community law and highlights some of the difficulties experienced by
its application to the English legal system.
The latter part of the article compares the operation of community law with
that of the federal system in the United States of America. In many respects the aims
of both systems are the same. There are some matters in which it is considered
essential that the law should be common or uniform throughout all the states, for
example, commerce. In the United States, commerce is largely a federal matter so
that goods can flow freely between the states.' Similarly in Europe, freedom of trade
is one of the major objectives of the EEC.2 Other matters are left to the discretion
of the various states. These tend to be matters which are of domestic concern only,
that is, those which do not affect other states, either of the United States or of the EEC.
It is inevitable that there are some differences between the two systems. The
federal system in the United States has been in place for over two centuries, whereas
the system in Europe is much more recent. One consequence of this is the desire in
Europe to achieve uniformity in many areas of law which in the United States would
3
be commonly within the realm of the state.
The EEC did not specifically use the United States as a role model for its legal
system, but nonetheless much can be learned from the federal system in respect to
*Nicola Preston, Fulbright Fellow, Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Akron from Wolverhampton Polytechnic, England. LL.M. University of Birmingham, 1985; LL.B. Manchester University, 1976.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 of the United States Constitution provides that trade between the states is a federal
matter, although trade within a state is under state control alone, provided that it does not impinge on inter

state commerce.
2Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, Belgium-Germany-France-Italy-Luxenbourg-Netherlands, J. GREENVILLE,
THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1973: A HISTORY AND GUIDE 412 (1974).
3 For example, the EEC has a Common Agricultural Policy which is uniform in each member state; the EEC

aims at uniformity in Value Added Tax whereas in the US sales tax is different in each state. Also, the driving
licences issued to individuals of member states of the EEC are now "EEC licences" and are valid in each

member state.
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the interests of justice and the practicable application of the law. The problems
experienced by the EEC are wider than those of the United States in that in Europe
the aim is for a uniform law which will operate to produce the same results in a variety
of very different legal systems. At least in the United States the basis of the legal
4
systems of the states were common.
European Economic Community
The European Economic Community was created by the Treaty of Rome in
1957. The United Kingdom joined the EEC on 1 January 1973 after signing the
Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972. The effect of the latter Treaty was to put
the UK in the same position, as from 1 January 1973, as if it had been a signatory to
the Treaty of Rome in 1957.1
The EEC had many aims; the economic advantages being the most obvious.
It was also the aim of the Community to create a new legal order to which all member
states would be subject, but which would remain separate from the national legal
orders. The concept was not that the two legal orders would compete with each other
but rather that they would complete each other. The objective was to achieve
uniformity throughout the Community. If this objective was to be realized, it was
essential, therefore, that community law be superior to the national laws of the
member states.
The legal order of the Community is an independent legal order. This means
that the methods of interpretation applicable to Public International Law are not
relevant. The laws are applied by member states as part of their own law, although
it is not national law. This has the advantage of ensuring that community law is
common to all member states in that it must be interpreted and applied in the same
way throughout the Community. The difficulties that could flow from this are
evident but the Community has provided, in Article 177 Treaty of Rome, that
member states may refer questions of the interpretation of community law to the
European Court of Justice, which can make the final determination as to its meaning.
Community law has many sources. The first is the Articles of the Treaty of
Rome itself. These set out the major objectives of the EEC in the form of general
principles, for example, Article 12 expounds the principle of freedom of trade;
Article 48 the principle of the freedom of movement of workers and Article 119 the
principle of equal pay for equal work.
' Except for Louisiana, which legal system is modelled on the French.
France was the driving force behind the concept of a European Economic Community and so it is not
surprising, therefore, that the community legal system was modelled on the French. In France much of the
domestic law is codified in the form of general principles, as is the Treaty of Rome. These principles are
largely interpreted according to the philosophy of'"the spirit of the law". The rules of statutory interpretation
that are used in the United Kingdom and United States, especially the literal rule, have little or no part to play
in the determination of the meaning of such codes.
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Secondary legislation is provided by Article 189 which states:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations,
issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in
its entirety and directly applicable in all member states.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
The purpose of such secondary legislation is to provide a more detailed
exposition of the principles embodied in the Articles so that the member states have
6
a more detailed guide as to the scope and extent of community law.
A further source of community law is the general legal principles which form
part of the common heritage of the member states.7 This can be illustrated by
reference to Article 1648 which provides, inter alia, "The Court of Justice shall
ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."
The reference contained therein to "the law" indicates that the authors of the Treaty
had an existing body of legal principles in mind. Thus, the Treaty is not to be
approached as if it were in a legal vacuum.
The exact scope of these general principles has not been defined and, indeed,
is probably incapable of definition. It is also questionable as to whether such general
principles can be accurately described as a source of law. It is submitted, however,
that they are at least a useful reminder that community law does not exist in a vacuum.
Finally, there are the decisions of the European Court of Justice. It will be seen later
that the function of this court is to declare the meaning of community law. The ambit
of the various provisions is contained in the judgments of the Court. These
judgments provide an invaluable insight into the scope and nature of the provisions,
even though technically they are not a true source of law as they are merely
declaratory.

6

For example, Treaty of Rome Article 119 enunciates the principle of equal pay for equal work. This has

been supplemented by Directive 75/117 (equal pay); and Directive 76/207 (equal treatment); and Directive

79/7 (pensions).
7 Advocate-General J.P. Warner, The Relationship between European Community Law and the National

Laws of Member States, 93 LQR 349 (1977).
8 Treaty of Rome, Article 164 defines the function of the European Court of Justice, infra.
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Operationof Community Law
One significant feature of community law is that of direct enforceability. This
means that certain (but not all) provisions of community law automatically become
part of the national law of member states, without the need for any further action on
their part. Such provisions may be relied upon by individuals before their national
courts. In this respect, community law is noticeably different from international law.
Under the latter, if a country, which is party to a treaty does not abide by its
provisions, then, whilst it might be accountable at an international level, at a local
level it is the national law that is to be applied. This is not so with community law,
as those provisions which are directly enforceable may be relied upon automatically
before the national courts.
Direct enforceability arises because a provision is either directly applicable or
directly effective. Some academics consider that there is little practical difference
between these two terms 9 but the majority view is that there is a valid distinction
between them.10 If a provision is directly applicable then individuals may rely on it
directly before their national courts, even in the absence of domestic legislation.
Some Articles of the Treaty of Rome have been held to be directly applicable, for
example, Article 119.11 If an Article is clear and unambiguous then it will be directly
applicable.' 2 In cases of doubt, the matter will be resolved by the European Court
of Justice, but that forum has statedI3 that if an Article is so worded that there can be
no doubt as to its meaning, then it will be directly applicable.
Regulations are also directly applicable since Article 189 expressly so
provides. 14 Directives, however, can never be directly applicable because Article
189 provides that they are to be addressed to member states and are binding only as
to the result to be achieved. In other words, some action has to be taken on the part
of the member state before a directive can form part of the national law. But this does
not mean that directives are robbed of all direct effect. The result of a provision being
directly effective is similar to where one is directly applicable, in that a citizen can
rely on it before the national courts. But in order for a provision to be held to be
directly effective, its terms must be appropriate to judicial application:' 5 a require' See Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisionsof Community Law: The Development of a Community Concept,
19

INT'L AND COMP.

COMMUNITY

L.Q. 257 (1970). See also, 1 TOTH

LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN

119 (1970).

" Winter, DirectApplicability and DirectEffect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law
9 COMMON MKT. L REV. 425 (1974); Dashwood The PrincipleofDirectEffect in Europeancommunity Law,

16 J.

COMMON MARKET STUD.

229 (1978);

MATHIJSEN,

A GUIDE

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

(1975).

Defrenne v SABENA, case 43/75 ECR 455 (1976).
See infra the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie de Belastinger, case 26/62 ECR 1, (1963).
2

1

Id.

See supra note 6.
See supra note 7; see also, Advocate-General Reischl in Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, case 148/78
CMLR 96 (1979).
'4
'5
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ment not present when considering whether a provision is directly applicable.
An early case on this point was Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie de Belastingen.16 In that case the European Court of Justice approached the
issue of direct effect somewhat cautiously but now the principle of direct effect is
widely accepted. The test is one of feasibility, 7 so that a provision which is not
directly applicable can be directly effective if it is clear, unambiguous, and lends
itself to judicial application.
A decision of the European Court is not necessary for a provision to be directly
applicable or directly effective. Such effect is inherent in the nature of the provision
itself. Nonetheless, the European Court frequently hears such cases, usually because
an individual is wishing to rely directly on a provision of community law and the
member state is opposing such reliance. 8 In these cases the European Court does not
decide the effect of the provision but merely declares its effect. This distinction,
albeit subtle, is crucial to the operation of community law.
From the foregoing it can be seen that a directive can never be directly
applicable since it does not automatically form part of the national law. It is simply
addressed to member states and the choice of form and method of introduction is
theirs. 19 Something further has to be done before its objective can be achieved. It
is because of this fact that it was once suggested that directives could not be directly
effective either because, as their implementation was left to member states, they did
not lend themselves to judicial application. This view was short lived because the
European Court has reached the opposite conclusion on several occasions. The first
British case was Van Duyn v. Home Office, 20 which concerned Directive 64/221 on
the freedom of movement of workers. The United Kingdom had taken no action to
implement the directive and, allegedly in contraction of it, were refusing the
admission of Miss Van Duyn, a Dutch Christian Scientist, into the United Kingdom.
She sought to rely on the directive directly. On the particular facts of the case she
was unsuccessful, but the European Court did say that Directive 64/221 was directly
effective because it was clear, unambiguous and capable of judicial application.
This decision is an important one and indeed was the only one that the
European Court could have reached. A contrary conclusion would have meant that
the United Kingdom would have been able to plead its own wrong. In other words,
a potential applicant would be unsuccessful because the United Kingdom had
1'6Supra note 12. This case concerned Treaty of Rome, Article 12. The action was brought by a Dutch

company which sought the repayment of tax that it claimed had been paid in contravention of Article 12. The
facts indicated that there had been an infringement of Article 12. The question, therefore, was whether the
company could bring the action. The European Court answered in the affirmative because Article 12 was
directly applicable.
17 T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 197 (1981).
18On the issue of equal pay, see Defrenne v. SABENA, case 43/75 ECR 455 (1976).
19Treaty of Rome, Article 189, supra note 8.
101 Ch 358 (1975), case 41174 ECR 1337 (1974).
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(wrongly) failed to implement the Directive. Initially, the decision in Van Duyn was
much criticized and it was argued that it extended the meaning of Article 189 beyond
its reasonable construction. That Article provides that Regulations are directly
applicable but that Directives are not. The choice of form and methods of
introduction is left to the member states. The decision of the European Court,
however, is not incompatible with that because many directives (including 64/221)
are so precise in detail that very little discretion is left to the member states.
There is one further issue that must be mentioned and that is the distinction
between vertical and horizontal direct effect. Vertical direct effect means that the
provision in question operates downwards only, that is, by applying to member
states. Horizontal direct effect means that the provision applies to citizens of the
member states also, in the sense that it can impose obligations on them. This
distinction is especially relevant in the case of Directives. Since they are addressed
to member states, 21they can only be held to be directly effective vis-A-vis the member
state. 22 They may only grant individual rights but may not impose obligations upon
individuals. 23 Thus, Directives can have only vertical direct effect. Miss Van
Duyn's argument was viable only because her claim was against the government of
the United Kingdom. This would not have been so had the issue involved the enforceability of her right against another private individual since that would have
meant that the other individual would be under an obligation to give effect to
community law.
To some extent, therefore, the distinction between Regulations and Directives
has been blurred since they both may be directly enforceable. But a valid distinction
does still remain as all Regulations are directly applicable, both vertically and
horizontally, whereas only some Directives have vertical direct effect.
European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is a creature of the EEC treaty. Its main
function is contained in Article 164 which provides that it is to ensure that, in the
interpretation and implementation of the Treaty Provisions, the law is observed. The
Bench of the Court consists of one judge from each member state.24 The Court is
assisted by Advocates-General, a body of professional lawyers. The procedure was
drawn up by the court itself, although, in accordance with Article 188, it has received
the approval of the Council.
As the Court was established by the Treaty, it has no inherent jurisdiction. It
has only that conferred on it by the Treaty. It is a court of first and only instance and
21Treaty of Rome, art. 189.
22Warner, supra note 7, at 359.
23 For a list of writers for and against this view, see Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on
Individuals? 4 EuR. L. REV. 67, 70 n.24 (1979).
24The United Kingdom judge is Lord MacKenzie Stuart, formerly of the Scottish Court of Session.
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its judgments are not the subject of appeal.2 5 Member states are able to refer matters
of community law to the European Court under Article 177.26 The essence of such
a reference is to ask the European Court for a preliminary ruling. The Court makes
an abstract judgment on the point of community law involved and does not make any
attempt to resolve the actual case before it. After delivering its single judgment, the
European Court then refers the case back to the national court to apply the law as
expounded by the European Court to the instant case.27 The reference consists of
questions put by the national court for the European court to answer. The sole
function of the European Court in this respect is to declare the meaning of
community law. 28 This system of reference by the domestic courts of the member
states has been described as embodying "une r~gle de bons sens et de sagesse." 29
As the structure of the European Court is largely based upon the French
system, it has, in theory, no legislative function. 30 There have been some cases,
however, where the consequences of a decision of the European Court have been
tantamount to legislation, for example, Defrenne v. SABENA. 3' Such cases,
however, are the exception rather than the rule and consequently are rare.
The hearings before the European Court are both lengthy and expensive. The
Court firstly hears argument from both sides involved in the case at issue. Then it
will hear argument from other interested parties, for example, one or more member
32
states may have views on the meaning of a particular provision of community law.
Next, the Advocate-General will deliver his opinion on the questions asked. This
opinion is written in the form of a judgment and is very persuasive, although the
European court is not bound to follow it. 33 Finally, the Court will deliver its own
21A judgment may be revised, however, if new facts are brought to light which are likely to be significant

to the decision. The new information must relate to the ratio decidendi of the case and not to the obiter dictum.
26A member state is not bound to refer issues under Treaty of Rome, Article 177. If a domestic court is able
to interpret a community law provision, for example, where its meaning is well-established and/or obvious,
then the domestic court may directly apply the relevant provision. See Costa v. ENEL, case 6/64 ECR 585
(1964); Pickstone v. Freemans, plc 1 AC 66 (1988).
27See for example, Macarthys v. Smith, IRLR 209 (1980).
28See Osram Gmbh v. Oberfonanzdirektion Frankfurt, case 183173 ECR 447, 485 (1974).
19Advocate-General Lagrange in Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, case
28/62 ECR 31(1963). See also Lagrange M, The Theory of the Acte Clair:A Bone of Contention or a Source
of Unity? 8 C.M.L.REV. 313 (1971).
""There is an obstinate belief upon the continent of Europe that a court does not have a legislative function."
Court of Justice of the European Communities Judicial and Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976,
Professor Hamson, Methods of Interpretation- A CriticalAssessment of the Results at II - 15.
31Supra note 11. Inthis case the European Court held that Article 119 on equal pay was directly applicable
and could be relied upon directly by a Belgian air hostess before her national courts, even in the absence of
any domestic legislation on the issue.
32For example, this has occurred on several occasions in equal pay cases. See Defrenne v. SABENA, supra
note 11. Worringham and Humphries v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., IRLR 178 (1981). On the issue of freedom of
movement of corporations see R v. HM Treasury and Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Daily mail
and General Trust plc, case 81/87 1 All ER 328 (1989).
33For example, in Macarthys v. Smith, IRLR 209 (1980), the Advocate-General was of the opinion that
Article 119 was so broad that it embraced a comparison with a hypothetical male. This aspect of his opinion
was not followed by the European Court.
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judgment, after taking time to consider the matter. The European Court delivers only
one judgment and concurring or dissenting judgments are not permitted. The reason
for this is to protect the judges so that they cannot be accused of favoring national
interests etc. All of the judges are involved in the drafting of the judgment, so that
each sentence can be the subject of lengthy discussion. Further, the single judgment
can mean that two lines of reasoning are followed, each leading to the same
conclusion. This indicates a division of opinion in the European Court, but as no
preference is indicated for one or the other, it hinders the extraction of the ratio
decidendi of the case. Alternatively, the court may delete certain parts of the
judgment which may be contrary to the opinion of one group of judges. The effect
of this can be that there are few, if any, reasons of substance given for the decision
34
and this again is unhelpful from a practical point of view.
The sole function of the European Court is to declare the meaning of
community law by answering the questions referred to it. This can cause difficulties
as the European Court makes no attempt to direct its answers to the actual case in
question, and so it is important that the questions are suitably phrased. The Court is
usually reluctant to alter the questions, although it has been known to do so.35
Further, the European Court will not answer allied questions even though they may
be relevant either in the context of the case or in the complete understanding of the
36
area of law involved.
A further difficulty is the problem of translation since the working language
of the European Court, and the EEC as a whole, is French. This can be illustrated
by reference to Article 119. The English text reads "equal pay for equal work"
whereas the French text reads "pour un m~me travail". In English the concept of
'equal work' is wider than the 'same work', and yet that is the literal translation of
the French. The European Court has to be wary of such pitfalls if community law
is to be applied uniformly throughout all member states.
The European Court knows no system of stare decisis although, usually, it
does follow its previous decisions even though it infrequently cites earlier cases or
indicates that the current decision is in accord with them.37 When the court declines
34

Hamson, supra note 30, at II - 20.
Burton v. British Railways Board, IRLR 116 (1982).
16Several United Kingdom cases on the issue of equal pay have been referred to the European Court. In each
of them the domestic court asked, inter alia , whether Directive 75/117 was directly effective. On each
occasion the European Court held that the issue could be resolved under Treaty of Rome Article 119 alone
and so declined to answer the subsidiary question. See Macarthys v. Smith, IRLR 209 (1980); Worringham
and Humphries v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., IRLR 178 (1981); Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd.
IRLR 228 (1981).
" HARTLEY at 157. In the early cases on equal pay, for example, Defrenne v. SABENA, supra note II.
Macarthys v. Smith, supranote 36, the European Court emphasized and reiterated that Article 119 covered
only overt or direct discrimination. In Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., IRLR 228 (198 1)
however, the European Court held that Article 119 also covered intentional covert or disguised discrimination. It should be noted that this is a decision which is within the spirit of the law.
15See
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to follow an earlier decision, it simply ignores it. It makes no attempt to distinguish
it or overrule it, but again such cases are rare.
In the interpretation of community law, the European Court adheres less
rigidly than the English Courts to the literal rule. Its main considerations are those
of policy and the changing needs of the Community. In this way the Court is able
to develop both the law and the Community itself. This again can present difficulties
when either predicting or explaining a decision. The policy considerations and the
needs of the Community fluctuate, and the decisions of the European Court oscillate
along with them, even to the extent of ignoring the actual words of the Treaty on
occasions.3"
Nonetheless, despite all of the above difficulties, the European Court does
perform a valuable function. The meaning of Articles of the Treaty and of secondary
legislation become clearer and more definite as a result of its decisions. The Court
does acknowledge some of the difficulties of member states when trying to adhere
to community law, 39 but the Court itself is one of the institutions of the EEC and must
necessarily look to the continued harmony of the EEC as a whole. This, of course,
may mean that one member state feels itself to be disadvantaged on occasions.
Nonetheless, from the community law point of view the European Court is regarded
as being effective in that it upholds and promotes the development of community
law.
Sanctions
One final point to consider when examining community law is what, if any,
are the sanctions available if a member state fails to comply with its treaty
obligations.40 The matter is firstly investigated by the Commission of the European
Communities under a power contained in Article 219. Discussions then take place
between the Commission and the member state concerned to see if it is possible to
resolve the matter. If it is not possible to do so, for example, because the member
state refuses to acknowledge that it is in breach of its obligations, the Commission
may bring the case before the European Court under Article 169. Only the
Commission has the power to do this, not other member states. The European Court
1s See

Rutili v. Minist~re de L'Interieur, case 36/75 ECR 1219 (1975), (on Treaty of Rome Article 48, the

freedom of movement of workers).
39 In Defrenne v. SABENA, supra note 11, the European Court imposed a temporal restriction on its
judgment, so that it could not be relied upon in respect of events prior to that date. This was in response to
a request by the Belgian Government, who feared a proliferation of equal pay claims. A similar request by
the United Kingdom Government in Worringham and Humphries v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., IRLR 178 (1981) was
refused.
I Note that Treaty of Rome Article 5 provides that all member states shall abstain from any measures which
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, and that they shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty, or resulting from an action taken
by the institutions of the Community.
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will then adjudicate as to whether or not a breach has been committed. 4' When
hearing such a case, the European Court refers only to the Treaty obligations and
42
takes no account whatsoever of wider issues, for example, national political crises.
This approach is essential if community law is to remain supreme. The European
Court believes that practical or political difficulties at a national level do not excuse
a member state from unilaterally failing to fulfill its Treaty obligations.43
Should a member state be found to be in breach and fail to execute the
judgment of the European Court, then it may be sued again for breach of Article
171." There is, however, no provision for sanctions if a member state persistently
refuses to comply with its obligations. This has been described as the last vestige of
sovereignty.45 But the recalcitrant member state may be put under much political and
economic pressure from its co-member states to comply. Frequently it is only this,
or a compromise, that will bring the violation to an end. Nonetheless, Article 169
is effective. Its operation is lengthy and this provides the member state with ample
time in which to amend its national law so that it complies with the Treaty. Also, all
of the member states realize that the continued existence and smooth working of the
Community can only be ensured by co-operation and the eventual fulfillment by all
of the Treaty obligations. Thus the procedure is effective because there is no reason
to believe that a member state would wantonly act contrary to its Treaty obligations.
Relationship between the law of the United Kingdom
and Community law
It has already been shown that if community law is to be effective, it must be
superior to the national law of the member states.46 As far as the United Kingdom
was concerned, this involved a basic dichotomy as Parliamentary sovereignty sat
somewhat uneasily alongside the new community legal order. A compromise was
effected through the European Communities Act 1972. 47 The position achieved was
that community law took priority because Parliament had so decided. The Community view is simply that it is community law which is supreme.
41See EC Commission v. United Kingdom, case 61/81 ECR 2601 (1982), on equal pay, where the European

Court held that the United Kingdom domestic law on equal pay (Equal Pay Act 1970) was insufficient to
fulfill the United Kingdom's Treaty obligations under Treaty of Rome Article 119. Following this case, the
Equal Pay Act 1970 was amended by the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 SI 1983/1794 which
came into force on 1 January 1984.
42See EC Commission v. Italy, case 30/72 ECR 161 (1973).
43 See EC Commission v. Belgium, case 102/79 ECR 1473 (1980).
44 For example, the notorious "sheepmeat" case, when France refused to accept consignments of English
lamb - EC Commission v France, case 232/78 ECR 2729 (1979).
45

D. LASOK AND J.W. BRIDGE,

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

303 (1982).
4See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
41Note that the European Communities Act 1972 does not expressly confer any additional jurisdiction on the
courts or tribunals of the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, all courts, and even tribunals, which only have the
jurisdiction given them by statute (and no inherent jurisdiction), apply and refer to community law where

appropriate.
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The purpose of the European Communities Act 1972 was to avoid conflict
between United Kingdom and community law. The European Court of Justice had
stated that the law stemming from the Treaty of Rome is an independent source of
law which cannot be overridden by domestic provisions.4 8 The 1972 Act attempted
to give force to this by providing:
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to
time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in
accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal
effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognized and available in law,
and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression
'enforceable community right' and similar expressions shall be read as
49
referring to one to which this section applies.
It can be seen that the Act provides that it is community law which may
determine whether or not a provision is directly enforceable. Whilst Parliament
clearly subordinated legislation existing in 1972 to community law, the references
in sections 2(4) and 3(1) to "enactments ... to be passed" raises the constitutional
difficulty: can Parliament bind itself as to the future? The doctrine of sovereignty
of Parliament is one that is fundamental to the British constitution, that is, Parliament
cannot limit its powers as to the future. Section 2(4) sought to obviate the problem
by declaring that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, statutes are subject to
community law unless the contrary appears. Furthermore, the House of Lords has
50
held that, as far as possible, statutes should be construed to give effect to treaties.
It is, of course, possible for Parliament to provide expressly that any Act is not
subject to community law. This has not occurred and, indeed, it would be most
surprising if it did because such action would demonstrate an overt lack of
commitment to the EEC on the part of the British Government. What may be more
likely is that Parliament might pass a law which, by oversight, conflicted with
community law. In such circumstances the European Communities Act 1972 would
be ignored.5 1 Fortunately, from the point of view of harmony, this has not occurred.
If it did, it would create considerable conflict because the United Kingdom view
would be that Parliament is supreme whereas the Community view is that commu4

Costa v. ENEL, ECR 585 (1964).

49 Section 2(1). It has been queried as to why the statute did not use the phrases "directly applicable" or

"directly effective" since their meaning was well known even in 1972. See John Usher "European
Community Law and National Law, The Irreversible Transfer?" University Association for Contemporary
European Studies, George Allen and Unwin 29 (1981).
sOGarland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., ICR 420 (1982). See also Areo Zipp Fasteners v. YKK Fasteners
(UK) Ltd., CMLR 819, 820 (1973) (where Graham J. went so far as to say that in the event of conflict,
community law would "override" English law).
"' For example, see the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Macarthys v. Smith, IRLR 316 (1979). Also, the
House of Lords in Garland v. BREL, ICR 420 (1982).
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nity law is supreme.52
In the absence of such conflicts, the United Kingdom courts must give effect
to community law when they are interpreting domestic statutes. From the United
Kingdom standpoint, difficulties could occur where community law is wider than the
domestic law.53 Again a solution is supplied by the European Communities Act

1972, which also provides that domestic law may be amended or extended so that it
accords with community law, by means of Regulations which must be laid before
Parliament.5" This legislative process is more expeditious than the enactment of a
new statute to remedy a situation. The single restriction of this procedure is that the
Regulations may extend only as far as community law. If the Government wished
to go further, for example, by conferring greater rights, then an Act of Parliament
must be used.
Comparison with the FederalSystem of the United States
The operation of the federal system is quite different from that of community
law. Federal law covers those matters declared by Congress to be within its province
and, generally, is distinct and separate from state law. It is interstitial in nature. In
the United States, the two systems of federal and state law work alongside each other
whereas in the EEC, community law is a gloss on the domestic laws of the member
states. This is simplistically expressed and it does not mean that there is no overlap
between federal and state law or that the two systems never come into conflict.
Essentially, however, the federal system of law is separate from the state laws and
is uniform and supreme in each of the states. Although there is a separate federal
court structure, state courts also need to be aware of and apply federal law in
appropriate cases because of its supremacy.5
Community law is also both uniform and supreme throughout the EEC but it
operates via the domestic laws of the member states, by direct applicability or direct
effect, rather than through a separate legal structure. This is necessary in Europe
where the member states of the EEC have very different domestic legal systems. The
diversity of state legal systems in the United States is not nearly so great and,
56
furthermore, the operation of federal law is based upon the same common system.
It has already been demonstrated that this is not the case in Europe. 57 One common
52But see minority view of Graham J., supra note 50.

D The domestic courts can, of course, give effect to community law when they can ascertain the community
law involved (and accept that it is wider than the domestic provision). See the House of Lords in Pickstone
v. Freemans, plc 1 AC 66 (1988).
" European Communities Act 1972 § 2(2)(a) and schedule 2. An example of these regulations is Equal Pay
(Amendment) Regulations 1983 SI 1983/1794.
" For example, where the case involves a federal question but the amount involved or in controversy is less
than $50,000: 28 USC § 1332(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
5 Except Louisiana.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
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feature, however, is that both systems have an element of common law." This is
essential to a dual system where one set of laws is supreme and must operate and be
enforced in the other.
A comparison of the operation of federal law with that of community law can
best be effected by considering, firstly, the interaction of state and federal law. In
this section, emphasis will be placed on federal occupation of the field since no
similar concept is known to community law. Secondly, the operation and jurisdiction of the. Supreme Court will be compared with the European Court of Justice.
Interaction of State and FederalLaw
The states exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts, except where
Congress, either expressly or by implication, has made the federal jurisdiction
exclusive. 9 In most cases it is provided by statute that the state courts must enforce
federal law but it is not essential that this is decreed by legislation. The state courts
must also enforce the increasing volume of federal common law. This federal
common law involves matters in which the federal interest is so strong that the
federal courts are free to develop substantive rules to protect that interest. In such
cases the state courts are obliged to follow the substantive rules expounded by the
60
federal courts.
In some instances Congress may expressly oust state power. In these cases the
position is clear. The state courts must apply federal common law and the state
cannot legislate on the matter. Problems can develop, however, when a vacuum is
created, albeit not expressly, by the federal legislation. Where this occurs, any state
action is held to be invalid even if it is consistent in detail with the federal statutes.
Thus, state action is pre-empted where a Congressional purpose to "occupy the
field" is divined. 61 Such purpose can be either substantive or jurisdictional. State
action, therefore, may be an invalid interference with a federal design either because
it is in conflict with the operation of a federal program or, whatever the substantive
impact, it intrudes into a field that Congress has validly reserved to the federal
sphere. 62 In such circumstances, even nascent federal occupation of the field is
sufficient to oust state law.
11In the EEC see supra note 6.

In the US see Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (where it was
provided that there is no federal common law in diversity cases but this decision does not extend to other
matters).
5
9 Redish & Muench, Adjudicationof FederalCausesof Action in State Court,75 MicH. L. REV. 311 (1976);
Note, State Enforcement of Federally CreatedRights, 73 Hpav. L. REV. 1551 (1960).
60
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Matthews, The State Courtsand the FederalCommon Law, 27 ALB.
L. REV 73 (1963).
6
1 See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore and M.S.Ry Co., 260
U.S. 261 (1922). See also, Note, Pre-Emptionas a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction12
STAt. L. REV. 208 (1959).
62 Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
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As federal law is supreme, if state law is in conflict with it, federal law must
prevail.63 But occupation of the field is more subtle than that because it means that
federal law can supersede state law even when there is no prima facie contradiction.
This could occur, for example, where the effect of state law is to encourage conduct
which the federal law discourages, 64 or where state law encourages conduct, the
absence of which would assist in the effectuation of a federal scheme as interpreted
and applied.65
It was once thought that if there was federal law on an issue then all state law
on the same issue was ineffective, even if the state law merely replicated the federal
law.66 This is not true today.67 Indeed, federal occupation of the field is not now

lightly inferred:
The principle to be derived from [the Supreme Court's] decisions is that
federal regulation of a field ... should not be deemed pre-emptive of state
regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the native
of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress
68
has mistakenly so ordained.
The reluctance to find complete federal pre-emption comports with the basic
conception of federal law as interstitial in nature. Furthermore, problems can occur
where federal occupation of the field is found when the federal legislation is not
comprehensive because of the consequent legal vacuum. In such a case today it is
less likely that state law would be found to be pre-empted. But where there is a
multiplicity of federal regulations, it is more likely that a conclusion of federal
occupation of the field can be supported.69

It has thus been demonstrated that the supremacy of federal law is effected in
a variety of ways, including occupation of the field. This latter method is very
different from the position of the supremacy of community law. In the EEC there
is no concept of occupation of the field. Indeed, it would be an anathema to the
philosophy behind the operation of community law since the law can operate only
63McDermott v. State, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).

4 Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
65Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
6 Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. v. Vamville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915); Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
67People v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines Inc.
372 U.S. 714 (1963). See also Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1973); White, ParticipantGovernmentalAction
Immunity from the AntitrustLaws: Factor Fiction?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 474 (1972); Shears, Antitrust Immunity
-- Reevaluation & Synthesis of Parkerv. Brown -- Intent, State Action, Causation, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1245
(1973).
68Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
19Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric, Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1974); Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffers and Helpers Union v. Morton 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Farmers
Educ. and Coop. Union of America v. WDAY Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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through the legal systems of the member states. This does not mean, however, that
community law cannot control or dominate a field. It may be that much (or all)
domestic legislation on an issue may exist only because of EEC obligations.7" The
member states must give effect to community law and if the EEC creates obligations
in an area where no domestic law or regulation exists, that member state must rectify
the situation. It would do this by passing legislation in accordance with the aims and
provisions of community law.
The Supreme Court and the European Courtof Justice
1. Constitution
The Supreme Court consists of nine judges. In this respect it is smaller than
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This difference, however, is not of major significance. The main distinguishing factor is that the judges of the Supreme Court are
all political appointments made by the President of the United States when vacancies
occur. It has been seen over the years how a President is able to control the political
thinking of the Supreme Court in this way."
In Europe the position is quite different. Article 167 of the Treaty of Rome
provides that the judges of the ECJ must be chosen :
from persons whose independence can be fully relied upon and who fulfill
the conditions required for the exercise of the highest judicial office in their
respective countries or are legal experts of universally recognized ability.
...

Thus, there is no minimal requirement that a judge of the ECJ is a "judge" in
his member state, although he commonly is. Further, although the member states
could influence the political bias of the ECJ by their appointments, their ability to do
so is restricted by their own mechanism for appointing judges. None of the major
member states entertain the political appointment of individuals to judicial office. In
England, for example, High Court judges are chosen from senior barristers of at least
ten years standing.72 Regard is had to their integrity and impartiality. Any demonstration of political affinity on their part would be viewed with disfavor and as an
73
impediment to the holding of judicial office.
In addition, Article 167 states that the individual must be qualified to hold the
70

See E.C. Commission v. United Kingdom, case 128/78 ECR 419 (1979), where the British Government
unsuccessfully contended that it was free to enact a permissive measure when Council regulation 1463/70
provided that the installation of tachographs in certain vehicles was compulsory. Prior to regulation 1463/
70 the United Kingdom had no domestic law on tachographs ("the spy in the cab").
" President F.D. Roosevelt appointed nine members to the Supreme Court during his term of office. President
R. Reagan appointed only three but he did so at a time that his appointees affected the balance of political
opinion of the court.
71Supreme Court Act 1981, § 10(3).
13 This reflects adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers in this context.
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"highest judicial office." In England, to become ajudge in the Court of Appeal one
needs to be either a High Court judge or a barrister of at least fifteen years standing. 74
To be eligible for appointment as a Law Lord, one must first have served for at least
two years in another judicial office or be a barrister of at least fifteen years standing."
Finally, each member state has control over the appointment of its member of
the ECJ. Thus, even if a member state's appointment of domestic judges is less
rigorous than in England and that member state made a political appointment to the
ECJ, it still could not control the political bias of the whole court. In this way the ECJ
is, if not apolitical, at least politically neutral.
2. Jurisdiction
There are many differences between the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
that of the ECJ. Firstly, the Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in the United
States,7 6 whereas the ECJ is a court of first and only instance. 7" The ECJ is not even
the "highest" court as cases may be referred to it at any stage of the domestic
proceedings.78 The Supreme Court has both original 79 and appellate jurisdiction. 8
In practice, the Supreme Court hears largely those cases referred to it by way of
certiorari,8' although the Court of Appeals can certify certain matters to the Supreme
Court. 82 Further, the Supreme Court itself has control over deciding which cases it
will hear. In this respect again the ECJ is different. It sees itself as having a duty to
accept the reference without questioning the reasons for it or criticizing the referring
court. 8 3 In this context, a reference to the ECJ is a judicial one which implies
uncertainty of the law in the opinion of the referring court. Thus, the Supreme Court
is able to control its workload whereas the ECJ cannot. Further in neither case do
the parties have control, that is, the parties have no automatic right to have their case
heard in the Supreme Court or in the ECJ. In the United States the case must be
accepted by the Supreme Court, and in the EEC, a domestic court of a member state
must refer the case. Also, in both courts a case will be rejected if it is academic or
moot.84
71 Supreme Court Act 1981, § 10(3).

7 Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, § 6.
7628 USC § 952 repealed by P.L. 92-310, Title II, § 206(e)(1), June 6, 1972, 86 Stat. 203.
71See supra note 24.
7 That is, there is no need for the case to go through the domestic appellate system first. The authority for
this referral in England is found in RSC Ord 114 r2(l).
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1978 & Supp. 1990).
8o U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"' See supra note 76.
82 28 USC § 1254 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
83 Portelange SA v. SA Smith Corona Marchant International, case 10/69 ECR 309 (1969); Italian State v.
Sacchi, case 155/73 ECR 409 (1974); Salonia v. Poidomani and Baglieri, case 126/80 CMLR 64 (1982).
84 Foglia v. Novello, case 104/79 ECR 745 (1980); Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello (No 2), case 244/80
1 CMLR 585 (1982); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. (1920) 808; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/7

16

Preston: One Unity, One Law
Summer, 1990]

ONE UNITY, ONE LAW

Secondly, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to hear three types of cases:
federal, constitutional, and diversity. The ECJ hears only cases involving issues of
community law." The EEC does not have a written constitution as does the United
States. The Treaty of Rome, however, does embody general principles but these are
not of the same type as those in the United States Constitution. Further, questions
relating to the scope and/or application of the articles of Treaty of Rome are matters
of community law. Indeed, the resolution of such issues is the most significant
feature of the ECJ. In a sense, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction here is similar.
Technically, constitutional issues are not matters of federal law, but neither are they
matters of state law. They do relate to all citizens of the United States and therefore,
are clearly outside the realm of state control.86 In this respect, therefore, constitutional issues are similar to federal issues because it is crucial that the interpretation
of the Constitution is uniform throughout each of the states.
Diversity cases also fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court hears these appeals, it is state law that is applied to them
and not federal law.87 The Supreme Court's major function in this respect is to
determine which state law is applicable.88 That the ECJ has no similar function is not
surprising. When the citizens of member states of the EEC are in dispute with each
other about a non-community law matter, the issue is resolved by the regular court
structure of the nations concerned. It is a matter of private international law. The
ECJ will only have a part to play when community law is involved, and only then if
a provision of community law requires interpretation which the domestic courts
involved feel unable to supply.
This difference in jurisdiction, therefore, is expected. In the US, the citizens
involved in the dispute are all citizens of the same country. The function of the
Supreme Court is to decide which parts of the law of the United States are applicable.
In Europe, a similar dispute may involve no aspect of community law, in which case
the matter clearly is outside the ambit of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. As community
law expands and covers more aspects of the lives of the citizens of member states,
the rrle of the ECJ may correspondingly expand, but this will be because the scope
of the law is wider, and not because the ECJ has had any additional jurisdiction
conferred upon it.
There is one final aspect of jurisdiction that merits further consideration and
that is the review of state court decisions. In the United States, the Constitution does
not expressly authorize the review of state court decisions, but the Supremacy Clause
85

See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.

8 This is not to say that state courts can never adjudicate on these matters.
87 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would
think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought." Per Judge Friendly in
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
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gives the Supreme Court such jurisdiction in certain classes of cases.89 The review
is limited to the "final judgments or decrees" of the state court. 90 However, even
where the judgment of the state court is final, the Supreme Court does not have the
power of review if the judgment can adequately be supported on independent state
grounds, 9' unless the state ground is unconstitutional. 92 In the context of federal law,
it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether or not there is an adequate state ground
for the decision. What is clear, however, is that a state cannot "invent" a new rule
for the occasion. 93 The reason for this limited review of the Supreme Court is that
it is not within the function of that court to render advisory opinions.94
The ECJ on the other hand does not have the power to review decisions of the
domestic courts of member states. It can only hear those cases that are referred to
it by the domestic courts which involve the interpretation of provisions of community law. It is important to note also that domestic courts are only obliged to refer
cases when they are unable to interpret the provisions of community law involved.
Thus, the domestic courts are free to place their own interpretations on community
law, 95 and the litigants do not have the right to have that interpretation challenged in
the ECJ. 96 At first sight, therefore, it would appear that there are no checks in this
system and that a member state would be free to "misinterpret" community law at
its own whim. But this view ignores the underlying philosophy of the EEC as well
as the independence of the judiciary. The aims of the EEC are harmony and the
uniform applicability of community law. Each member state voluntarily joined the
Community, and therefore, would not wish to be seen as disregarding its basic
objectives by overtly interpreting community for itself in a way obviously contrary
to that which would be employed by the ECJ. Thus, the tendency has been for
member states to interpret provisions for themselves only when their meaning (from
a community law point of view) was clear. If there was any ambiguity, the matter
normally would be referred to the ECJ. Further, although the ECJ itself has no power
to review state court decisions, the Commission is the watchdog of the Community.
It has the power, under Article 169, to take a member state to the ECJ for failure to
comply with Treaty obligations. 97 Case law is just as much "law" as legislation and
there is no reason why a member state could not become the subject of investigation
8928 USC § 1257 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Apparently this section does not extend to the review of state court
decisions involving federal common law only.
91On the meaning of "final" in this context see Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93
U.S. 108 (1876); Dept. of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942); Cole v. Violette, 319 U.S. 581 (1943); Cox
Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
91Henry v. State, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
92Ward v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
93Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); State v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See
also Justice Holmes in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
9, See Justice Jackson in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-6 (1945).
95
See for example, the House of Lords in Pickstone v. Freemans plc [ 1988] 1 AC66 on the interpretation of
Article 119.
The litigants would have the usual rights of appeal available to a higher domestic court.
97See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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by the Commission if it persistently misinterpreted community law in the manner
suggested.
3. Procedure
Finally, there are a few practical comparisons in the operation of the courts that
are worthy of note. Firstly, both courts make declarations. However, that is the only
order that the ECJ may make, whereas the Supreme Court is not so restricted.
Further, a declaration of the ECJ will declare the meaning of community law; one
in the Supreme Court could also declare the rights of the parties. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has the power to enforce its judgments if necessary, which the ECJ
does not.
Secondly, there are many similarities in the conduct of the cases although
these may not, at first, be apparent. The ECJ hears both sides, any interested parties
and the Advocate-General. The Supreme Court hears only both sides, but has much
assistance by way of amicus curiae. In this way, therefore, each court has a wide
variety of arguments and opinions presented to it.
Finally, the format of the judgments of the courts are different. It has already
been seen that the ECJ delivers only a single judgment. Supreme Court decisions
usually consist of one majority judgment and one dissent, but there are more than one
in either or both categories on occasions. This distinction is expected because of the
need in the ECJ to eliminate any hint of national bias, which need is obviated in the
United States' system. Furthermore, community law is still in the early stages of
development and it could be argued that a single judgment promotes its uniformity.
Again, this reason is not relevant to the United States.
CONCLUSIONS

The objective of securing "one law" that is common for all states is more
difficult to achieve in the EEC than in the United States. One reason for this is the
differences in the legal systems of the member states of the EEC. In the United
States, the legal systems of most states are "common." The single exception is
Louisiana where the law is based on the French system. However, this is not a major
problem as it is not difficult for Louisiana to interpret and apply federal law because
that law is specific, especially where it is embodied in a statute. Although there can
always be problems with interpretation, it is infrequent that there is doubt about the
substance of the law.
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it is much more difficult for that
nation to adjust to community law, if only because there are so many gaps to fill in
and that has to be achieved without the aid of the literal rule. Thus, the courts of the
United Kingdom have experienced problems in determining the meaning of some
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aspects of community law. Such difficulties are enhanced by the fact that community law is constantly being developed by the ECJ. For example, in the early cases
that were referred to the ECJ on the interpretation and application of Article 119, the
ECJ repeatedly stated that the Article applied only to direct and overt discrimination.
But in a later case, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (ClothingProductions)Ltd.,9 8 the ECJ held
that Article 119 applied also to indirect and overt or disguised discrimination where
that discrimination was intentional.
Another difference between the two systems is that there is a more concentrated effort in the EEC to achieve uniformity. This is effected, inter alia, by having
community law cover more aspects than does federal law. Federal law has been in
place for over 200 years. At the time of the United States Constitution, many states
were either in the process of, or had only recently achieved, the regularization and
efficient administration of their own legal systems. Thus the federal system and the
state systems grew and developed together, alongside each other.
Again, this is different in the EEC. The legal systems of many member states
have been in place for centuries and this alone makes them more resistant to change.
This is especially true where, as in the case of the United Kingdom, the existence
community law involves issues of supremacy and sovereignty. Technically, such
issues were resolved by the European Communities Act 1972, but sovereignty goes
much deeper than that. In the United States, all citizens think of themselves as
"American" first, rather than as "Ohioian" for example. That is not so in Europe,
where individuals regard themselves as "English", "French" or "German" first,
and not as "Europeans". This reason alone indicates that the system of community
law is best suited for its purpose. The fact that it operates only through the medium
of the legal systems of the member states means that the problems of supremacy and
sovereignty are minimised. Further, the system itself also promotes both uniformity
and compliance in the various member states. It is difficult for the lay person in the
EEC to identify readily a piece of community law. The same is not true for the
majority of federal law in the United States.
Thus, each system has many common aims and objectives. The operation of
the systems, however, is not identical, but each is best fitted to achieve those aims
and objectives within the confines of the systems in which they have to operate.

9

' Supra note

36.
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